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‘Social Realism’ has long underpinned the dominant discourse in 
history education in England (Smith, 2017). Its commitment to 
‘powerful’ disciplinary knowledge has enabled history educators 
to assert the unique contribution that their subject makes to a 
child’s education and fomented an apparent consensus about 
the aims and purposes of a history education.   
In this paper, we argue that it is increasingly a consensus under 
strain. While the terms ‘powerful knowledge’ and ‘social realism’ 
are widely used by history educators, their overuse as rhetorical 
devices has weakened their precision and undermined some of 
their theoretical potency.  We suggest that this has given rise to 
a split within social realist history educators between ‘Radical’ 
and ‘Traditional’ social realists.  Both use the language of social 
realism and both subscribe to the theory’s epistemic 
underpinning, but disagree about the nature and significance of 
powerful knowledge. 
These are wide-ranging context models which we intend to 
develop in more detail elsewhere. We here restrict our analysis 
to the theorisation of powerful knowledge in each. 
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Following on from the ferocious arguments about the relative merits of “subject 
knowledge” and “skills” in the 1980s (Phillips, 1998), the National Curriculum 
created a consensus in History teaching which held until the last two years.  This 
consensus about the nature and purpose of a good historical education was 
reflected in the 2007 National Curriculum. NC 2007 was a conceptually-focused 
curriculum which expected children to develop their knowledge of disciplinary 
concepts (such as change, causation and evidence) and substantive concepts 
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such as (empire, migration, ideas and beliefs).  While Yates and Young (2010) 
complained of ‘evacuation of content’ in the curriculum, this accusation could not 
be fairly at levelled History. As Fordham (2013b) pointed out, what the 2007 
curriculum lacked was not content, but the specification of content.  By framing 
knowledge around conceptual understanding in this way, (instead of listing events 
to be studied) the history curriculum, at least, perhaps prefigured many of the 
arguments later made by social realists. 
As has been argued elsewhere (Smith, 2017), this unity was particularly useful in 
periods of curriculum contestation during which the history teaching community 
was able to use a disciplinary defence of its subject to resist unwelcome curriculum 
change. This unity has, however, fractured somewhat in recently and, ironically, it 
has been the arguments of some social realists (a position which many history 
educators continue to espouse) which has permitted this split.  Although most 
history educators subscribe nominally to a disciplinary understanding of the 
subject, there has been considerable divergence on the question of what 
constitutes ‘powerful knowledge’ in a Bernsteinian (Bernstein, 1999) horizontal 
discourse like history.   
Like Beck (2013) we do not agree with dismissive references to ‘powerful 
knowledge’ as a ‘sexy-sounding phrase’, we do argue that – in history education 
at least – it has become a magic mirror which reflects whatever the viewer wishes 
to see.  Based on their interpretation of powerful knowledge, we theorise two 
distinct fields/positions which differ over the definitions of both of the words. We 
term these: Radical Social Realism (RSR) and Traditional Social Realism (RSR) 
(for a more detailed comparison see Figure 3 in Appendix A).  
Figure 1. 
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To the radical social realist, historical education is powerful if it orientates children 
in time and asks them to consider the way in which the discipline of history works 
– how accounts are constructed and how they might be interrogated. Lee (2011) 
refers to this simply as ‘historical literacy’. Traditional social realists whilst agreeing 
with aspects of this position, also espouse the ‘power’ of certain core knowledge 
which, they argue builds understanding of historical concepts (e.g. peasant, 
parliament etc.).  The most recent writing from Traditional Social Realists, most 
notably Counsell and Fordham, has sought to marry the work of Young and E.D. 
Hirsch. Which leads to the prioritising of certain pieces of knowledge as being 
inherently more significant. This is in contrast to the more mainstream Social 
Realist position that important knowledge emerges through disciplinary 
discussions and is therefore transitive. Although Young (Young, et al., 2014; 
Young, 2011) explicitly repudiates any similarity between their ‘future three’ 
curriculum and the neo-traditionalism of Hirsch, the Traditional Social Realists see 
no such tension. 
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The remainder of this paper will develop these two models with reference to 
published work on the history curriculum and interpret them in relation to the 
writings of Michael Young.  
Michael Young and (Powerful) Knowledge 
Put simply, social realism accepts that knowledge is socially constructed and 
therefore transitive, but that knowledge is of something intransitive that is both 
independent of the knower and unchanged by knowledge; this reality of that 
knowledge transcends the circumstances of its production.  This position, 
therefore, rejects both naive realism, which disregards the social construction of 
knowledge, and a relativist position which denies the possibility of judging between 
competing truth claims. The role of a school curriculum in this conception is to 
equip children with the theoretical knowledge to ‘transcend particular contexts so 
that it can be used to think the unthinkable and the not-yet-thought’ (Wheelahan, 
2010, p. 13).   
To Social Realists, this necessitates a curriculum built around disciplinary 
knowledge which, although socially constructed, offers the best training for thinking 
in this way.  Young labels this powerful knowledge and writes, 
 ‘[Powerful Knowledge] refers to what the knowledge can do or 
what intellectual power it gives those who have access to it. 
Powerful knowledge provides more reliable explanations and 
new ways of thinking about the world and acquiring it can provide 
learners with a language for engaging in political moral and other 
kinds of debates’. (Young, 2008b, p. 14) 
Young also offers the helpful distinction between powerful knowledge and 
knowledge of powerful.  The latter refers to knowledge that has cultural capital 
solely because it is possessed by the powerful. However, the mistake of early 
sociologists of education was to assume that its possession by the powerful was 
the sole determinant of the importance of knowledge. As Young (2008b, p. 14) 
writes, ‘characterising knowledge as high status tells us nothing about knowledge 
itself.’  
At this juncture, there is a need to define more closely what is meant by ‘knowledge’ 
in history. There are, we suggest, three forms of knowledge. The first is the 
metahistorical – the understanding of how the discipline of history works, how 
historical knowledge is constructed. The second is the substantive-conceptual – 
an understanding of concepts such as migration, power and other concepts that 
are central to thinking like an historian. The third is at the level of individual facts 
or truth claims.  In the diagram below (Figure 2), these three types of knowledge 
are plotted on a chart which compares them in terms of explanatory power. The 
dashed line shows what Radical Social Realists believe frame the curriculum, while 
the position of Traditional Social Realists is shown with a solid circle. It should be 
stressed that TSRs do not see the metahistorical as unimportant and nor do RSRs 
see facts as unimportant – the issue is whether these should frame the curriculum. 
The Radical Social Realists emphasise the explanatory power of History, whilst 
Traditional Social Realists emphasise the need to build on learnt discrete 
knowledge statements. Whilst some out and out traditionalists consider History to 
be simply a body of knowledge, with no role for concepts or understanding.  The 
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position of thoroughgoing traditionalists – for whom disciplinary knowledge is 









Figure 2  
 
 
Radical Social Realism 
Although it did not bear the name, we would argue that a kind of social realist 
thinking has long underpinned history education discourse in England. Perhaps 
the most important thinker in shaping this way of thinking has been Peter Lee.  As 
long ago as 1991, he prefigured many of the Social Realist arguments about 
children acquiring disciplinary knowledge and the primacy of the theoretical over 
the everyday, 
‘The ability to recall accounts without any understanding of the 
problems involved in constructing them or the criteria involved in 
evaluating them has nothing historical about it. Without an 
understanding of what makes an account historical, there is 
nothing to distinguish such an ability from the ability to recite 




This position is remarkably similar to Wheelehan’s social realist view that 
‘[students] need access to ‘disciplinarily’ or disciplinary styles of reasoning so that 
they understand how knowledge is used and the broad criteria that need to be 
applied in evaluating the validity of arguments’ (2010, p. 2).  For Lee, a historical 
education has to be rooted in the theoretical. It could not be reduced to learning 
the shared cultural markers offered by an ‘everyday’ understanding of the past 
whether elite cultural canon or the unifying myths of a street gang.   
In much the same way, Lee foreshadowed social realist arguments about the 
transformative power of historical understanding  
“History changes our whole view of the world, of what the present 
is and of what human beings are and might be… The reason for 
teaching history is not that it changes society, but that is changes 
pupils; it changes what they see in the world, and how they see 
it” (Lee, 1991, pp. 42-43) 
 
In emphasising a disciplinary approach to the subject grounded on the ‘intrinsic’ 
value of history, Lee (1991, p. 42) opposed all extrinsic motivations for teaching 
the past whether it be the ‘good citizens’ of the progressive left (White, 1992) or 
‘confident patriots’ of the right (Baker, 1989).  Lee (2011) later refined his 
arguments about the purpose of history and coined the term ‘historical literacy’ to 
encapsulate his view of why a rigorous historical education was a necessary 
entitlement of all students. This was to be an education which oriented children in 
time and bestowed a theoretical and disciplinary understanding of how and why 
historians were able to make claims about the past.  Such a view accords with 
Wheelehan (2010, p. 2) that ‘disciplinary knowledge constitutes the means society 
uses to transcend the limits of individual experience… all societies need to 
connect… the thinkable and the unthinkable, the here and the not here… The 
capacity to do so is a precondition for the existence of society’. 
Although Lee’s work is the foundation of what we term ‘Radical Social Realism’ in 
the discipline of History, it is important to note that we do not mean the word 
‘Radical’ in an overtly political sense, but rather in its more literal sense of 
facilitating change. ‘Radical’ social realists do not propose an activist curriculum or 
especially favour the teaching of hidden or marginalised histories.  However, they 
do oppose any conception of canonical knowledge, ‘core knowledge’ that is in 
some way more important to know than other, non-canonical knowledge.  They 
hold this argument not from a political perspective as earlier sociologists of 
knowledge did (Young, 1971), but from an ontological one.  The concept of lists of 
approved knowledge or consensus narratives is rejected not because of political 
bias, but because of the ontological arrogance that any list necessarily implies. Any 
knowledge claim, and by implication any historical canon is inherently transitive. 
The list may change as new evidence is revealed, new questions asked or new 
groups become ‘worthy’ of entering the canon. The past, as opposed to history, is, 
however, intransitive: events happened whether we know about them or not, 
whether they are part of the canon or not. Furthermore, our knowledge does not 
change these events in any way. Our knowledge will always be partial, so the 
question ‘whose knowledge is of the most worth?’ remains in a modified and 
restricted form. It is not the discipline of history which is repressive, but rather a 
common-sense view that certain items of knowledge are inherently more powerful 
than others. This is not to argue that all knowledge is equally powerful, like Young 
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we acknowledge that knowledge is created and tested by disciplinary processes 
and this process has the potential to produce knowledge nearer to the truth and as 
such has the potential to become knowledge that is powerful.  
Young (2008a) argued that progressives were naturally attracted to the 
transgression of subject boundaries, but Lee’s position seems to defy this, as does 
Bhaskar’s (2010) vigorous defence of disciplines in his conception of 
interdisciplinarity as a means to understand climate change. 
For radical social realists, it is the contextual contingency of substantive knowledge 
which makes it a poor basis for a school curriculum. As Young (2008a, pp. 88-89) 
points out, ‘knowledge is socially produced by communities of knowledge 
producers and… these communities are characterised by struggles around power 
and competing interests’.  Consequently, a curriculum framed around concepts is 
important, but the emphasis should be on those second-order (change/ causation) 
and metahistorical (evidence/ accounts) concepts which shape the discipline, not 
on concepts presumed to emerge organically from a canon of core knowledge. 
Until very recently, there was considerable agreement about the value of a social 
realist approach among history educators.  In 2011, Counsell wrote ‘Disciplinary 
Knowledge for all’ which celebrated the influence of Young’s ideas on history 
teaching. In the same year, Harris and Burn (Harris & Burn, 2011) used arguments 
from social realism to attack ‘ill-disciplined’ thinking in New Labour education 
policy. Similar arguments have been made in countries across the world e.g. South 
Africa (Bertram, 2009), Scotland (Smith, 2016) and New Zealand (Ormond, 2016). 
The emergence of Traditional Social Realism 
In 2013, the announcement of a history curriculum based around core knowledge 
in England was almost universally opposed by history educators (Smith, 2017). 
However, from 2015 onwards, a number of influential writers on the history 
curriculum (associated originally with the Cambridge History PGCE) began to 
change their position markedly.  Both Michael Fordham (2012) and Christine 
Counsell (2011) had previously written approvingly of the theoretical contribution 
made by social realism, however, recently, (Counsell, 2017; Fordham, 2016) this 
has combined with an enthusiasm for the traditionalism of E. D. Hirsch.  We term 
this position Traditional Social Realism. Unlike thoroughgoing traditionalists who 
see core knowledge alone as the essence of the subject, Traditional Social 
Realists see core knowledge and disciplinary knowledge as mutually reinforcing.  
We suggest that such a framing blurs Young’s sharp and helpful distinction 
between powerful knowledge and the knowledge of the powerful. By looking at two 
examples of TSR thought, it is possible to see the tensions that such a position 
creates. 
Fordham has made a series of comments that show his commitment to the 
teaching of knowledge. In 2013 in his review of Christodoulou’s book ‘Seven Myths 
about Education’ (Fordham, 2013b), he praises her for having similar ideas to the 
Cambridge PGCE course and placing knowledge at the heart of History teaching, 
saying she could add to “the growing literature we have in the history education 
community on how pupils’ historical knowledge can be improved.” He emphasised 
the importance of knowledge in his 2015 blog “Is understanding a thing?” where 
he juxtaposed his understanding of medieval kingship with that of a Year 7 pupil 
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(age 12) and with that of Professor Rosamond McKitterick. He collapses all 
discussion of understanding into knowledge, with the comment that Prof 
McKitterick “…knows a great deal more…” and arguing that we cannot tell where 
knowing becomes understanding. For Fordham, understanding is simply a product 
of the accumulation of examples, and the more examples one acquires the better 
one’s understanding. 
However, Fordham’s approach never addresses the questions of ‘which 
examples?’ or ‘whose examples?’.  It is possible to acquire many examples and 
still possess a partial or distorted picture. ‘Understanding’ must surely refer to the 
strength of one’s grasp on the concept, the ability to construct an explanation of it 
and the ability to judge the quality of others’ explanations. We do this on the 
grounds of plausibility, coherence, the neatness of the explanation as well as its 
relevance and applicability. He postulates understanding, as the old Empiricists 
did, as a point to be reached when things are known rather than a space in which 
learning takes place. He ends his discussion, on his website, with a hearkening 
back to a putative Golden age of Teaching with the claim 
“We have been conditioned in the field of education to be afraid 
of the word ‘knowledge’ and, perhaps because of this, to dress 
it up as something else. It’s about time that we stripped away 
these confusions and got back to the thing at the heart of 
teaching: knowledge.” (Fordham, 2015) 
Counsell (2017) takes an even more uncompromising line on knowledge.  This 
chapter makes three arguments which depart significantly from her earlier work 
and which lean heavily on ED Hirsch and psychologist Daniel Willingham for their 
inspiration. First, she argues, following Hirsch, that it is only substantive knowledge 
based on exposure to multiple prototypes of an abstract concept which permits 
abstract thinking. Second, she implies that the explicit teaching of second-order 
(disciplinary) concepts is a poor substitute for the teaching of substantive 
knowledge. Third, she argues that curriculum planners should ‘make certain items 
non-negotiable for memorisation… in England, as least, systematic attention to 
recall is rare in… non-examination classes’ (Counsell, 2017, p88).  Using an 
example of the English Civil War, she cites several items of ‘non-negotiable 
knowledge’ including ‘Charles I, Archbishop Laud, the Bishops War and the Irish 
Rebellion’.  By itemising knowledge in this way, one wonders what the criteria are 
for selection or exclusion. Could it be that certain knowledge makes the cut 
because it is the knowledge of the powerful?  
Young argues that ‘Intellectual development is concept-based not a content-based 
or skill-based process’ (Young, 2010, p. 25). While all social realists would agree, 
Counsell’s position raises the question of what is the ‘proper’ level of concepts 
around which to base a curriculum.  For the Radical Social Realists, metaconcepts 
both procedural (change, evidence) and substantive (migration, war) are 
appropriate – Traditional Social Realists agree, but argue that meaningful 
‘progress’ in understanding these concepts can only be achieved by a close focus 
on the exemplification (prototypes) of these concepts. 
It is not always clear, though, which concepts are being exemplified. Concepts are 
necessarily nested – each apparent particular is a specific example of something 
larger.  Is war a concept? Is Civil War? Is the English Civil War? Is the Bishops 
War?  Each of these is colligation (the term given by Walsh (1958) to a group of 
related events) and each is conceptual in a way that Archbishop Laud is not. A 
continual focus on specific examples need not necessarily lead the students into 
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an understanding of the abstract, scientific, concept. In fact. it is an error to assume 
that growing substantive knowledge leads directly to better conceptual 
understanding.  
Fordham and Counsell’s position can be contrasted with that of the Radical Social 
Realists. For example, Shemilt (2009) argues for a concept-first curriculum in 
which children ‘…should also be taught how to form and test generalizations, and 
to use second-order concepts as organizational principles as well as analytical 
tools’ (p190).  For RSRs, it is these kinds of concepts that Young is promoting in 
his view of curriculum. Limon goes even further to argue that “…students’ 
understanding of historical content is often filtered by their history meta-concepts 
and epistemological beliefs about history and its learning” (Limon, 2002, pp. 276-
277). 
These concepts are scientific concepts; they need to be taught as they do not 
emerge from everyday experience. For RSRs, substantive knowledge does not 
precede conceptual or epistemological understanding. 
Young’s own position in relation to this is difficult to ascertain. In 2010, he 
addresses common misconceptions of social realism by exemplifying the kinds of 
concepts that might frame the curriculum, 
‘As a former Chemistry teacher and lecturer in sociology, I have 
some idea of chemistry’s concepts, like periodicity and valency, 
and those of sociology, like solidarity and social class.’  (Young, 
2010, p27) 
He has probably deliberately chosen one example from a Bernsteinian vertical 
discourse (Chemistry) and one from a horizontal discourse (social science). 
However, an important difference between these two is apparently overlooked.  In 
vertical discourses the conceptual precedes the particular. The concept (such as 
valency) is identifiable and the valency of a particular ion can be identified. Indeed, 
it was the strength of this concept that allowed Mendelev to propose the existence 
of as yet undiscovered elements. Concepts in horizontal discourse have no such 
predictive power since they are merely colligations assembled by the historian. In 
these cases, the conceptual follows the specific – concepts are, in a sense created 
by the examples which exemplify them. To take a somewhat clichéd example, are 
the Irish troubles an example of the concept of terrorism or the concept of war?  To 
the Radical Social Realist, a conceptual curriculum does not escape the problem 
of whose knowledge, or rather whose examples, we should use. 
What Michael Young might make of Traditional Social Realism is difficult to 
ascertain.  On the one hand, he has repeatedly distanced himself from a Hirschean 
curriculum. He dismisses the neo-traditionalism of former Education Minister 
Michael Gove as ‘trapped in its own elitist past’ and claims that, ‘With its ‘given’ 
concept of subject knowledge, Future1 began to lose credibility of the Second 
World War because it was unable to respond … to the new knowledge that was 
being produced’ (2011, p. 267). Similarly, in Knowledge and the Future School he 
attacks ‘The traditional model [which] treats knowledge as given and as something 
that students have to comply with’ (2010, p22).   
 
However, in his 2016 chapter of Masterclass in History Education, Young came 
closest to endorsing a Traditional Social Realist view of history education when he 
endorsed Fordham’s chapter in the same book (Young, 2016) claiming that the 
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work of Fordham and others “…are ahead of anything that curriculum theorists are 
suggesting” (Young, 2016, p. 185).  However, as we have discussed above, 
Fordham’s approach amounts largely to the accumulation of examples, which he 
sees as enriching and problematising conceptual understanding. Our view is that 
more examples can enrich conceptual understanding, but there is no reason it 
necessarily should be so.  The accumulation of more and more one-sided 
examples merely creates more certainty that one’s world view is correct. We are a 
long way from the transformative power of a historical education espoused by Lee 
(Lee, 2011). 
 
Conclusion: Social Justice or Social Mobility? 
In her introduction to ‘Why knowledge matters in curriculum’ Leesa Wheelahan 
(2010) makes an impassioned plea for the link between curriculum knowledge and 
social mobility, arguing that vocational education that does not take students 
beyond their everyday experience forces the students into lower paid low status 
jobs.  It is, of course, overwhelmingly the case that senior positions in society are 
occupied disproportionately by those who attended private and selective schools 
and this is, in anyone’s eyes, an unfairness.  Indeed, this argument from social 
immobility has been used by traditionalists to justify their core knowledge curricula.  
The extent to which ‘knowledge’ can itself be a decisive factor in changing this is 
clearly up for debate.  Social Realists of all stripes believe that knowledge can bring 
about change – that knowledge does have inherent power as it gives access to 
“…society’s conversation about what it should be like.” (Weelahan 2010 p.9).  
Where traditional and radical social realists differ is over the nature of that 
knowledge and the nature of that change. 
To traditional social realists, the test of a school curriculum is the extent to which 
children from ordinary schools compete with those from more selective or 
prestigious establishments, social mobility expressed as academic success. The 
key to this is clearly cultural literacy – the disadvantaged should speak the 
language of the powerful. To a radical social realist, this undermines the 
transformative power of powerful knowledge as these knowledge claims are 
asserted to be more powerful without being tested within the disciplines. 
Knowledge can transform lives, but it does this neither through tradition nor the 
accumulation of knowledge fragments such as ‘Archbishop Laud’.   Instead, lives 
are transformed by the epistemic insight that a rigorous history curriculum confers. 
The central knowledge question for children is not ‘what do I need to know’, but 
rather ‘how do we come to know what we think we know?’  It is the latter question 
that allows children to take part in society’s conversation about itself. It is the latter 
question which confers the ability to challenge and question.  It is the latter question 
which truly represents powerful knowledge. 
 
NB. 
This paper is an extract form a longer essay which develops these two positions in 
more detail. While this article focuses solely on knowledge in the curriculum, the 
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longer piece will take in questions about purpose and pedagogy in greater detail. 
The Venn diagram below gives an insight into how these models might be 
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